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Abstract—Face presentation attack detection (PAD) has be-
come a thorny problem for biometric systems and numerous
countermeasures have been proposed to address it. However,
majority of them directly extract feature descriptors and dis-
tinguish fake faces from the real ones in existing color spaces
(e.g. RGB, HSV and YCbCr). Unfortunately, it is unknown for
us which color space is the best or how to combine different
spaces together. To make matters worse, the real and fake faces
are overlapped in existing color spaces. So, in this paper, a
learned distinguishable color-liked space is generated to deal
with the problem of face PAD. More specifically, we present
an end-to-end deep learning network that can map existing
color spaces to a new learned color-liked space. Inspired by the
generator of generative adversarial network (GAN), the proposed
network consists of a space generator and a feature extractor.
When training the color-liked space, a new triplet combination
mechanism of points-to-center is explored to maximize interclass
distance and minimize intraclass distance, and also keep a safe
margin between the real and presented fake faces. Extensive
experiments on two standard face PAD databases, i.e., Relay-
Attack and OULU-NPU, indicate that our proposed color-liked
space analysis based countermeasure significantly outperforms
the state-of-the-art methods and show excellent generalization
capability.
Index Terms—Face Presentation Attack Detection, Color-liked
Space, Triplet Mechanism
I. INTRODUCTION
AS one of the most natural clues for identifying indi-viduals, faces have been used as the biometric trait in
many biometric recognition systems [1], [2], especially since
face recognition technology has reached a satisfactory level of
performance. Nowadays, large scale face recognition systems
can be easily to be found, such as the Unique Identification
Authority of India (UIDAI), which offers identity to all India
residents [3]. Although these biometric systems have achieved
high accuracy on recognizing customer faces, fake faces still
can easily fool or bypass them [4], [5]. With the popularity of
Internet communication and social media, people’s biological
information can be rapidly proliferated leading to the criminals
can easily access to face pictures or videos. Actually, once a
face image is shared in the Internet, there is no further control
over that image. For instance, Olaye [6] has reported that
a mobile app called FindFace allows uploading a picture to
access that person’s social network data including good quality
images that can be used for face PAD. To make matters even
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Fig. 1. Samples of face presentation attacks. From left to right: printed face
photos, displayed face images or replayed videos, and 3D masks.
access that person’s social network data including good quality
images that can be used for face PAD. To make matters even
worse, it is not difficult for the criminals to use the biological
information to launch a presentation attack. Therefore, con-
sidering this urgent security situation, an effective and reliable
face PAD method must be developed for circumventing and
detecting such threats.
According to different kinds of fake faces, there are four
types of presentation attacks that can be considered: (i) printed
face photos, (ii) displayed face images, (iii) replayed videos
and (iv) 3D masks. In printed face photo attacks, the face
photos are printed on paper and placed in front of the camera.
Sometimes in order to produce aliveness signals such as eye
blinking to confuse face recognition system, eye area of the
photo will be cut off and replaced with real eye blinking. In
both displayed image and replayed video attacks, the attacker
uses a digital screen to show face images or videos. Compared
with printed photo and displayed image attacks, replayed video
attacks can exhibit motion and liveness information and are
more challenging on common cameras. 3D mask scenario
refers to utilizing 3D printing technology [7] and virtual
reality [8] to fabricate a face mask and presenting the mask
for presentation attack. However, 3D attacks are much more
expensive to launch compared with traditional printed photo,
displayed image and replayed video attacks [9]. Fig. 1 shows
an example of different face presentation attacks.
In the last decade, many face PAD methods have been
proposed to detect fake faces [3], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. However,
most methods directly extracted features and analyzed the
differences between real and fake faces in existing color
spaces (e.g. RGB, HSV and YCbCr). For instance, [10], [12]
worse, it is not difficult for the crimin ls to use the biological
nforma ion to launch a presentation attack. Therefore, con-
sidering this urgent security situat on, n effective and reliable
face PAD method must be d veloped for circumventing and
det cting such threats.
According o ifferent kinds of fake fa es, there are four
typ s of presen ation attacks that can be considered: (i) printed
face photos, (ii) displayed face images, (iii) replayed videos
and (iv) 3D m sks. In prin ed f ce ph to attacks, the face
photos are printed on paper nd placed in front of th camera.
Sometimes in order to produce aliv ness signals such as ey
blinking to confuse face recognition system, eye ar a of the
photo will be cut off and replaced with real eye blinking. In
oth displayed image and replayed video attacks, the ttacker
uses a digital s reen to show face images or videos. Compared
wi printed photo and displayed image att cks, replayed video
attacks can exhibit motion and l venes information and are
more challenging on common cameras. 3D mask scenari
refers to utilizing 3D printing technology [7] and virtual
reality [8] to fabricate a face mask and presenting the mask
for presentation attack. However, 3D attacks are much more
expensive to launch comp r d with tra itional printed photo,
displayed image nd replayed video attacks [9]. Fig. 1 shows
an xample of different face presentation attacks.
In the last deca e, m ny face PAD methods have been
proposed to detect fake faces [3], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11],
[12], [13], [14], [15] [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. Howev r,
m st meth ds directly extracted features and analyzed the
differences between real and fake faces in existing color
spaces ( .g. RGB, HSV and YCbCr). For instance, [10], [12]
stinguished real faces with the ones in gray-scaled space
and [9], [13] detected presented fake face in RGB color
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Fig. 2. The distribution of some real and fake faces of Replay-Attack database
[10] in RGB color space. The red circles are the real faces. The green, blue
and black circles are fake faces. In this figure, we extract features from the
pre-trained VGG-19 model [24] and visualize them in a 3D space.
and [9], [13] detected presented fake faces in RGB color
space. Although these methods can achieve good detection
performance, the real faces and fake faces are overlapped
in original color spaces as shown in Fig. 2. Especially with
the popularity of high-resolution screen and high-definition
printer, the fake faces are getting closer to the real faces
leading to detection task becomes more difficult. Therefore,
we propose an end-to-end deep learning network to generate
a new color-liked space, where the real and fake faces can be
separated as much as possible.
Inspired by generative adversarial network (GAN) [21], a
color-liked space generator is constructed to map existing color
spaces. Then, a feature extractor is designed to obtain features
from the learned color-liked space. As aforementioned, the
goal of our proposed network is to separate the real and
fakes as much as possible. Therefore, we introduce a novel
points-to-center triplet mechanism to train the generator. The
flowchart is illustrated in Fig. 3. Finally, the extracted features
are fed into a Support Vector Machine (SVM) [22] classifier to
detect face presentation attack. We train and test our proposed
method on two public available databases: Replay-Attack [10]
and OULU-NPU [23]. The experimental results demonstrate
the effectiveness and excellent generalization capabilities of
the proposed method in various fake face detection compared
to the state-of-the-art approaches.
Among the significant contributions of this present paper,
we can cite:
1) Different from most previous works that detect pre-
sentation attack in existing color spaces, we propose
a novel and appealing approach based on color-liked
space analysis. By maximizing interclass distance and
minimizing intraclass distance, the learned color-liked
space can separate fake faces and genuine ones as much
as possible instead of overlapping each other.
2) We develop a new points-to-center triplet training mecha-
nism. Unlike traditional mechanism, the proposed points-
to-set mechanism can guarantee a stable decline in triplet
loss.
3) Extensive experimental analysis is conducted on the two
latest and challenging face PAD databases using their
pre-defined publicly well-defined experimental evaluation
protocols ensuring the reproducibility of the results and
a fair comparison with the state-of-the-art methods. Fur-
thermore, in our cross-database evaluation, our generated
color-liked space shows promising generalization capa-
bilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II reviews the existing state-of-the-art methods of face
PAD and briefly provides the development of triplet network.
Section III describes our proposed color-liked space analysis
based method. Section IV provides the details of experimental
setup and Section V discusses the obtained results. Finally, in
Section VI, we conclude the paper and discuss some directions
for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
A. State-of-the-art of Face PAD
In the past few years, face PAD has received great attention
and many detection approaches have been developed [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. Based
on different clues, these countermeasures can be further cate-
gorized into texture analysis [10], [12], [13], motion analysis
[14], [15], [25], image quality analysis [16], [17], [18], [19],
[20], and hardware based methods [11], [19], [20], [26], [27],
[28].
1) Texture analysis based methods: Due to the limitations
of printers and display devices, there are substantial differences
in color distribution and edge texture between real and fake
faces. Therefore, multi-scale local binary pattern (LBP) fea-
tures [12] were extracted to describe edge texture differences.
In another work, Chingovska et al. [10] used different kinds
of LBP features to improve detection accuracy. To capture the
color differences in luminance and chrominance, Boulkenafet
et al. [13], [29] proposed a method by computing LBP features
from different color spaces and concatenating all LBP into
a single feature vector. Apart from [13], Boulkenafet et al.
[30] constructed a Gaussian pyramid and extracted multi-scale
textural features from it. In this work, the method shows
superior detection performance in inter-database test. Instead
of using LBP features, Akshay et al. [31] extracted Haralick
[32] texture features for face PAD. With the recent advances
of deep learning in computer vision [33], [34], deep textures
have also been applied in face PAD. Yang et al. [35] proposed
an end-to-end convolutional neural network (CNN) model for
face PAD. Instead of using fully-connected layers, Li at al.
[36], [37] extracted hand-crafted features from convolutional
feature maps and showed some promising performances. For
capturing texture variations, Xu et al. [38] proposed a long
short memory network (LSTM) and Li et al. [39] proposed a
3D CNN to detect face presentation attacks, respectively. In
Fig. 2. The distribution of some real and fake faces of Replay-Attack database
[10] in RGB color space. The red circles are the real faces. The green, blue
and black circles are fake faces. In this figure, we extract features from the
pre-trained VGG-19 model [24] and visualize them in a 3D space.
space. Although these methods can achieve good detection
performance, the real faces and fake faces are overlapped
in original color spaces as shown in Fig. 2. Especially with
the popularity of high-resolution screen and high-definition
printer, the fake faces are getting closer to the real faces
leading to detection task becomes more difficult. Therefore,
we propose an end-to-end deep learning network to generate
a new color-liked space, where the real a d fake faces can be
separat d as much a possible.
Inspired by generative adversarial network (GAN) [21], a
color-liked space generator is constructed to map existing color
spaces. Then, a feature extractor is designed to obtain features
from the learned color-liked space. As aforementioned, the
goal of our proposed network is to separate the real and
fakes as much as possible. Therefore, we introduce a novel
po nts-to-center triplet mechanism to train the gen rator. The
flowchart is illustrated in Fig. 3. Finally, the extracted features
are fed into a Support Vector Machine (SVM) [22] classifier to
detect face presentation attack. We train and test our proposed
method on two public available databases: Replay-Attack [10]
and OULU-NPU [23]. The experimental results demonstrate
the effectiveness and excelle t generalization capabilities of
the proposed method i various fake face detection ompared
to the state-of-the-art approaches.
Among the significant contributions of this present paper,
we can cite:
1) Different from most previous works that detect pre-
sentation attack in existing color spaces, we propose
a novel and appealing approach based on color-liked
space analysis. By maximizing interclass distance and
minimizing intraclass distance, the learned color-liked
space can separate fake faces and genuine ones as much
as possible instead of overlapping each other.
2) We develop a new poi ts-to-center triplet training mecha-
nism. Unlike trad tional mechanis , the proposed points-
to-set mechanism can guarantee a stable decline in triplet
loss.
3) Extensive experimental analysis is conducted on the two
latest and challenging face PAD databases using their
pre-defined publicly well-defined experimental evaluation
protocols ensuring the reproducibility of the results and
a fair comparison with the s at -of-the-art methods. Fur-
thermore, in our cross-database evaluation, our generated
color-liked space shows promising generalization capa-
bilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II reviews the existing state-of-the-art methods of face
PAD and briefly provides the development of triplet network.
Section III describ s our proposed color-liked space analysis
based method. Section IV provides the details of experimental
setup and Section V discusses the obtained results. Finally, in
Section VI, we conclude the paper and discuss some directions
for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
A. State-of-the-art of Face PAD
In the past few years, face PAD has received great attention
and many detection approaches have been developed [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. Based
on different clues, these countermeasures can be further cate-
gorized into texture analysis [10], [12], [13], motion analysis
[14], [15], [25], image quality analysis [16], [17], [18], [19],
[20], and hardware based methods [11], [19], [20], [26], 27],
[28].
1) Texture analysis based methods: Due to the limitations
of printers and display devices, there are substantial differences
in color distribution and edge texture between real and fake
faces. Therefore, multi-scale local binary pattern (LBP) fea-
tures [12] were extracted to describe edge texture differences.
In another work, Chingovska et l. [10] used different kinds
of LBP featur s to improve detection accuracy. To capture the
color differences in luminance and chrominance, Boulkenafet
et al. [13], [29] proposed a method by computing LBP features
from different color spaces and concatenating all LBP into
a single feature vector. Apart from [13], Boulkenafet et al.
[30] constructed a Gaussian pyramid and extracted multi-scale
textural features from it. In this work, the method shows
superior detection performance in inter-d tabase test. Instead
of using LBP features, Akshay et al. [31] extracted Haralick
[32] texture features for face PAD. With the recent advances
f deep learning in computer vision [33], [34], deep textures
have also been applied in face PAD. Yang et al. [35] proposed
an end-to-end convolutional neural network (CNN) model for
face PAD. Instead of using fully-connected layers, Li at al.
[36], [37] ext acted hand-crafted fe tures from convolutional
feature maps and showed some promising performances. For
capturing texture variations, Xu et al. [38] proposed a long
short memory network (LSTM) and Li et al. [39] proposed a
3D CNN to detect face presentation attacks, respectively. In
another work, Li at al. [9] combined hand-crafted features with
3deep learning features and learned an embedding function that
can measure the distribution similarity of different face images.
More recently, a LBP network [40] has been designed for face
PAD which simulates the idea of basic LBP. These texture
analysis based approaches have good detection performances
when the artificial traces are obvious, such as rough face tex-
ture. However, with the popularity of high-definition screens,
their detection performances tend to decrease drastically.
2) Motion analysis based methods: Apart from texture
analysis, motion also plays an important role in face PAD.
For instance, based on the fact that involuntary eyes blink-
ing often occurs in the interval of 2 to 4 seconds [41],
an undirected conditional random field framework [14] was
proposed to detect printed photo attacks. Compared with the
fixed background of real face, the background of fake face is
dithering. Therefore, Anjos et al. [25] detected fake face by
analyzing motion correlation coefficient between face region
and background. Moreover, facial motion variations were also
explored for face PAD. In [42] and [43], LBP-TOP [44]
and LDP-TOP [45] features were extracted to describe these
variations, respectively. In another work, Santosh et al. [46]
used dynamic mode decomposition (DMD) to capture the
dynamics of movements. Instead of analyzing facial motion,
some works have tried to depict the media and its movements
(for example the paper, mobile phone and laptop). Bao et al.
[47] addressed 2D face PAD by detecting planar media. Tan
et al. [15] used Difference-of-Gaussians (DoG) to extract the
differences in motion deformation patterns between real and
fake faces. Since there are no aliveness signals in 3D mask
attacks, Li et al. [48] proposed an 3D mask PAD method by
estimating pulse from face videos. Although motion analysis
based methods are effective to static image attacks and 3D
mask attacks, these methods can still be easily fooled by
replayed video attacks. Therefore, it is necessary to request
the subject to perform specific movements [49], [50].
3) Image quality analysis based methods: Methods based
on image quality analysis exploit the fact that the character-
istics of reproduced face images or videos typically present
lower quality and loss of detail and sharpness. Therefore, some
methods took advantage of high frequency components of face
image to recognize fake faces. In [17] and [16], DoG filters
were used to extract high frequency information. In another
work, Li et al. [18] dealt with the problem of face PAD based
on a learned high frequency feature mapping function. Instead
of high frequency information, Pinto et al. [51] minimized
possible negative impacts on low-level features and extracted
them to describe the missing detail and sharpness in fake faces.
Wen et al. [2] extracted four different kinds of features (i.e.
specular reflection, blurriness, chromatic moment and color
diversity) to catch the light reflection differences between real
and fake faces, which are caused by the medium of liquid-
crystal display (LCD) screen. Galbally et al. [52] extracted
different kinds of image quality assessment features to describe
the quality of real and fake faces. In [53], several different
non-reference image-quality features and dense optical flow
features were fused to capture the fake faces that have low
quality. Such image quality analysis based approaches are
expected to work well for low-resolution printed photo attacks
or when using crude face masks, but are likely to fail for high
quality displayed images, replayed videos or 3D masks.
4) Hardware based methods: In addition to analyzing face
images and videos, additional or non-conventional hardwares,
e.g., multi-spectral, depth and light-field cameras, have been
applied to acquire useful information about the reflectance
properties and the shape of the observed faces. For instance,
based on the fact that there is no depth information in 2D
presentation attacks, Erdogmus et al. [11] proposed a method
by detecting a planar surface such as a video display or
a printed paper (not bent). Pavlidis et al. [19] and Zhang
et al. [20] acquired the reflectance maps by computing the
upper-band of near-infrared (NIR) spectrum and combining
two photodiodes respectively, instead of using intrinsic image
decomposition algorithm like [2]. More recently, light-field
cameras allow exploiting disparity and depth information from
a single capture. Therefore, these kinds of cameras have also
been introduced into face PAD task [26], [27], [28]. Even
though hardware-based methods can achieve good perfor-
mances for replayed video attacks, some of them might present
operation restrictions in certain conditions. For instance, the
sunlight can cause severe perturbations for NIR and depth
sensors; wearable 3D masks are obviously challenging for
those methods relying on depth data.
B. Triplet Network
Triplet network [54], [55] is extended from siamese network
[56], which aims to find a mapping function from original
feature space to new distance space where the same class
samples are similar than those from different ones. While
ensuring maximizing interclass distances and minimizing in-
traclass distances, the triplet network can also maintain a
secure margin between different classes compared to siamese
network. In the past few years, many computer version and
multimedia analysis tasks such as face verification and person
re-identification (Re-ID) have explored the effectiveness of
triplet network. For instance, Ding et al. [57] used the triplet
loss to learn a deep neural network for person Re-ID. Wang
et al. [58] addressed person Re-ID problem by presenting a
unified siamese and triplet deep architecture which can jointly
extract single-image and cross-image feature representations.
In [59], Swami et al. proposed a triplet network for face
verification and got promising results. Wang et al. [60] de-
signed a siamese-triplet convolutional neural network with
a ranking loss function to learn visual representations from
unlabeled videos. As far as we know, although triplet network
can achieve better performance, there is no relevant work to
introduce it into face PAD.
III. PROPOSED FACE PAD METHOD IN LEARNED
COLOR-LIKED SPACE
In this section, we present the pipeline of our proposed face
PAD method that extracts features from a learned color-liked
space. The proposed method consists of three parts, i.e., color-
liked space generator, feature extractor and triplet loss. The
overall process pipeline is shown in Fig. 3. Firstly, the captured
RGB face image is fed into color-liked space generator, which
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Fig. 3. The flowchart of proposed face PAD method in learned color-liked space. First, the color-liked space generator is used to learn a new color space,
which has three channels as existing RGB space. Then, a feature extractor module and triplet loss are invoked to maximize interclass distance and minimize
intraclass distance.
RGB face image is fed into color-liked space generator, which
can map existing color space into a new space. Then, the
learned color-liked face image, real face images and fake face
images are fed into the weights shared feature extractors to
get deep features. Finally, the points-to-center triplet training
mechanism is used to maximize interclass distance and mini-
mize intraclass distance, and also keep a safe margin between
different face classes. The following paragraphs explain the
parts in more detail, respectively.
A. Color-liked Space Generator
The architecture of color-liked space generator is shown in
Fig. 4. In order to map existing color spaces and use pre-
trained deep learning model to extract features, the convo-
lutional feature maps with three channels are outputted by
color-liked space generator. More specifically, given a color
video frame f(x, y), a convolutional layer with filter size of
3× 3× 3× 64 and a leaky rectified linear unit (lReLU) layer
are firstly used to process f(x, y). Then, these feature maps
are passed through a series of concatenated residual blocks.
In each residual block, the input is skip connected to its
outputs as He et al. [61]. Finally, the resulting feature maps
are passed through a convolutional layer with filter size of
3×3×64×3 and the generated color-liked space of last layer
is denoted as f
′
(x, y) = G(f(x, y),W1), where G(·) denotes
the mapping function of the color-liked space generator and
W1 represents the generator parameters. It is noted that the size
of all convolutional filters in the generator is 3×3 allowing for
deeper models at a low number of parameters [62]. Moreover,
the batch normalization (BN) layer [63] is introduced after
convolutional layer. The hierarchic link of color-liked space
generator is summarized in Table I.
B. Feature Extractor
A perceptual similarity measure is proposed by Dosovit-
skiy and Brox [64] as well as Johnson et al. [65]. Rather
than computing triplet loss in generated color-liked space,
our proposed method first maps the generated color-liked
TABLE I
THE ARCHITECTURE OF COLOR-LIKED SPACE GENERATOR. Conv IS THE
OPERATION OF CONVOLUTIONAL LAYER AND BN IS THE OPERATION OF
BATCH NORMALIZATION. w AND h ARE THE SIZE OF INPUT RAW IMAGE.
Output Size Layer
w × h× 3 Input f(x, y)
w × h× 64 Conv,lReLU
w × h× 64 Residual:Conv,BN,lReLU,Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Residual:Conv,BN,lReLU,Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Residual:Conv,BN,lReLU,Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Residual:Conv,BN,lReLU,Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Residual:Conv,BN,lReLU,Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Conv,lReLU
w × h× 3 Conv
space into a feature space by a differentiable function ∅.
After feature extraction, the generated f
′
(x, y) can be written
as ∅(f ′(x, y),W2), where W2 represents the parameters of
feature extractor. Compared to generated color-liked space,
∅(f ′(x, y),W2) allows color-liked space generator outputs that
may not match the same class image with pixel-wise accuracy
but instead encourages the generator to produce images that
have similar feature representations.
For the feature mapping ∅, we exploit the pre-trained
implementation of the popular VGG-19 [24] network, which
consists of stacked convolutional layers coupled with pooling
operations to gradually decrease the spatial dimension of the
image and to extract higher-level features in higher layers. To
acquire high-level features, we use the last fully connected
layer to describe the image obtained in the generated color-
liked space.
C. Points-to-Center Triplet Loss
To begin with, let F+ = {f+1 , f+2 , ..., f+i , ..., f+m} be the
real face image set and F− = {f−1 , f−2 , ..., f−j , ..., f−n } be
the fake face image set, where m and n denote the number of
different face images in F+ and F−, and f+i and f
−
j represent
the ith and jth face image in F+ and F−, respectively. The
Fig. 3. The flowchart of proposed face PAD method in learned color-liked space. First, the color-liked space generator is used to learn a new color space,
which has three channels as existing RGB space. Then, a feature extractor module and triplet loss are invoked to maximize interclass distance and minimize
intraclass distance.
can map existing color space into a new space. Then, the
learned color-liked face image, real face images and fake face
images are fed into the weights shared feature extractors to
get deep f atures. Fin lly, the points-to-center triplet training
mechanism is used to maximize interclass distance and mini-
mize intraclass distance, and also keep a safe margin between
different face classes. The following paragraphs explain the
parts in more detail, respectively.
A. Color-liked Space Generator
The architecture of color-liked space generator is shown in
Fig. 4. In order to map existing color spaces and use pre-
trained deep learning model to extract features, the convo-
lutional feature maps with three chan els are outputted by
color-liked space generator. More specifically, given a color
video frame f(x, y), a convolutional layer with filter size of
3× 3× 3× 64 and a leaky rectified linear unit (lReLU) layer
are firstly used to process f(x, y). Then, these feature maps
are passed through a series of concatenated residual blocks.
In each residual block, the input is skip connected to its
outputs as He et al. [61]. Finally, the resulting feature maps
are passed through a convolutional layer with filte size of
3×3×64×3 and the generated olor-liked space of last layer
is denoted as f
′
(x, y) = G(f(x, y),W1), where G(·) denotes
the mapping function of the color-liked space generator and
W1 represents the generator parameters. It is noted that the size
of all convolutional filters in the generator is 3×3 allowing for
deeper models at a low number of parameters [62]. Moreover,
the batch normalization (BN) layer [63] is introduced after
convolutional layer. Th hierarchic link of color-liked space
g n rator is summ rized in Tabl I.
B. Feature Extractor
A perceptual similarity measure is proposed by Dosovit-
skiy and Brox [64] as well as Johnson et al. [65]. Rather
than computing triplet loss in generated color-liked space,
TABLE I
THE ARCHITECTURE OF COLOR-LIKED SPACE GENERATOR. Conv IS THE
OPERATION OF CONVOLUTIONAL LAYER AND BN IS THE OPERATION OF
BATCH NORMALIZATION. w AND h RE THE SIZE OF INPUT RAW IMAGE.
Output Size Layer
w × h× 3 Input f(x, y)
w × h× 64 Conv,lReLU
w × h× 64 Residual:Conv,BN,lReLU,Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Residual:Conv,BN,lReLU,Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Residual:Conv,BN,lReLU,Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Residual:Conv,BN,lReLU,Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Residual:Conv,BN,lReLU,Conv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 onv,BN,Sum
w × h× 64 Conv,lReLU
w × h× 3 Conv
our proposed method first maps the generated color-liked
space into a feature space by a differentiable function ∅.
After feature extraction, the generated f
′
(x, y) can be written
as ∅(f ′(x, y),W2), where W2 represents the parameters of
feature extractor. Compared to generated color-liked space,
∅(f ′(x, y),W2) allows color-liked space generator outputs that
may not ma ch the same class image with pix l-wise accuracy
but instead encourages the generator to produce images that
have similar feature representations.
For the feature mapping ∅, we exploit the pre-trained
implementation of the popular VGG-19 [24] network, which
consists of stacked convolutional layers coupled with pooling
operations to gradually decrease the spatial dimension of the
image and to extract higher-level features in higher layers. To
acquire high-level features, we use the last fully connected
lay to describe the image obtained in the generated color-
liked space.
C. Points-to-Center Triplet Loss
To begin with, let F+ = {f+1 , f+2 , ..., f+i , ..., f+m} be the
real face image set and F− = {f−1 , f−2 , ..., f−j , ..., f−n } be
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Fig. 4. The architecture of proposed color-liked space generator. The generator consists of a series of concatenated residual blocks and the input of each
residual block is skip connected to its outputs.
goal of our color-liked space generator is to find a space map-
ping function that can minimize intraclass distance, maximize
interclass distance and keep a safe margin between F+ and
F−. In triplet network, conventional works randomly select
triplet training samples to train the network [57], [58], [59].
However, this kind of points to points selection mechanism
restricts the stability of network training. As illustrated in Fig.
5(a), when randomly combining triplet training samples, the
distribution of different classes may change in the same di-
rection leading to the interclass distance cannot be maximized
according to our goal.
In order to tackle the problem of triplet training sample
combination, we chose a center image as the anchor image and
combine triplet samples with it, as shown in Fig. 5(b). More
specifically, all face images in F+ and F− are sequentially
fed into the initialized color-liked space generator and pre-
trained feature extractor, where the results are represented
as T+ = ∅(G(F+,W1),W2) = {t+1 , t+2 , ..., t+i , ..., t+m} and
T− = ∅(G(F−,W1),W2) = {t−1 , t−2 , ..., t−i , ..., t−n }. The cen-
ter of real face features can be calculated as t+ = 1m
∑m
i=1 t
+
i .
Then the anchor image of F+ is the one that is a real face
image with the nearest Euclidean distance from the feature
center t+ and denoted as f+c , where c is the index of the
anchor image. Given a threshold τ , if the Euclidean distance
between the real face image and the anchor image is greater
than τ , the real face image and the anchor image form a image
pair with same class represented as {f+c , f+p }; if the Euclidean
distance between the fake face image and the anchor image
is less than τ , then the fake face image and the anchor image
compose an image pair with heterogeneous classes written as
{f+c , f−p }. Finally, the points to set triplet training samples are
denoted as {f+p , f+c , f−p }Pp=1, where p and P are the index
and the number of triplet training samples, respectively. As
aforementioned, our goal is to minimize the distance between
f+p and f
+
c , maximize the distance and keep a safe margin
between f−p and f
+
c . Therefore, the loss function of the goal
can be formulated as Eq. 1.
L = 1
P
P∑
p=1
max{
||∅(G(f+c ,W1),W2)− ∅(G(f+p ,W1),W2)||2−
||∅(G(f+c ,W1),W2)− ∅(G(f−p ,W1),W2)||2, γ}
(1)
where γ is the safe margin and the role of the max operation
with γ is to prevent the overall value of the loss function from
being dominated by easily identifiable triplets [57].
D. Gradient of Parameters
In training stage, the stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
algorithm [66] is used to learn the network parameters. So,
calculating the gradient of parameters is the first important
thing. Let d(fp,W1,W2) be the difference in distance between
{f+c , f+p } and {f+c , f−p } in the triplet sample:
d(fp,W1,W2) =
||∅(G(f+c ,W1),W2)− ∅(G(f+p ,W1),W2)||2−
||∅(G(f+c ,W1),W2)− ∅(G(f−p ,W1),W2)||2
(2)
and the loss function can be rewritten as
L = 1
P
P∑
p=1
max{d(fp,W1,W2), γ} (3)
Then the partial derivative of the loss function about W1 can
be calculated as Eq. 6.
∂L
∂W1
=
1
P
P∑
p=1
h(fp) (4)
h(fp) =
{
∂d(fp,W1,W2)
∂W1
if d(fp,W1,W2) > γ
0 if d(fp,W1,W2) ≤ γ
(5)
Based on the definition of d(fp,W1,W2), its gradient can be
obtained as follows:
∂d(fp,W1,W2)
∂W1
=
2(∅(G(f+c ))− ∅(G(f+p ))) ·
∂∅(G(f+c ))− ∂∅(G(f+p ))
∂W1
−
2(∅(G(f+c ))− ∅(G(f−p ))) ·
∂∅(G(f+c ))− ∂∅(G(f−p ))
∂W1
(6)
where ∅(G(f+c )) is the abbreviation of ∅(G(f+c ,W1),W2),
∅(G(f+p )) is the abbreviation of ∅(G(f+p ,W1),W2), and
∅(G(f−p )) is the abbreviation of ∅(G(f−p ,W1),W2), respec-
tively. For the parameter W2 in feature extractor, its gradient
can also be obtained as W1.
. .
the fake face image set, wh re m and n denote the number of
d fferent face images in F+ and F−, and f+i and f
−
j represent
the ith an jth face imag in F+ and F−, r sp ctively. The
goal of our color-liked space generator is to find a space map-
p ng functio th t can minimize intraclass distance, maximize
interclass distance and keep a safe margin between F+ and
F−. In riplet network, conven ional works randomly select
triplet training sa ples to trai the n twork [57], [58], [59].
However, this k nd of point to points sel ction mechanism
s ricts the stability of network training. As illustrated in Fig.
5(a), when randomly combining triplet training samples, the
distribution f different classes ay change in the same di-
rectio leading to the interclass distance cannot be maximize
according to our goa .
In order to tackle the problem of triplet training sample
combination, we chose a center image as the anchor image and
combine triplet samples with it, as shown in Fig. 5(b). More
specifically, all face images in F+ and F− are sequentially
fed into the initialized color-liked space generator and pre-
trained feature extractor, where the results are represented
as T+ = ∅(G(F+,W1),W2) = {t+1 , t+2 , ..., t+i , ..., t+m} and
T− = ∅(G(F−,W1),W2) = {t−1 , t−2 , ..., t−i , ..., t−n }. The cen-
ter of real face features can be calculated as t+ = 1m
∑m
i=1 t
+
i .
Then the anchor image of F+ is the one that is a real face
image with the nearest Euclidean distance from the feature
center t+ and denoted as f+c , where c is the index of the
anchor image. Given a threshold τ , if the Euclidean distance
between the real face image and the anchor image is greater
than τ , the real face image and the anchor image form a image
pair with same class represented as {f+c , f+p }; if the Euclidean
distance between the fake face image and the anchor image
is less than τ , then the fake face image and the anchor image
compose an image pair with heterogeneous classes written as
{f+c , f−p }. Finally, the points to set triplet training samples are
denoted as {f+p , f+c , f−p }Pp=1, where p and P are the index
and the number of triplet training samples, respectively. As
aforementioned, our goal is to minimize the distance between
f+p and f
+
c , maximize the distance and keep a safe margin
betw en f−p and
+
c . Therefore, the loss unction of the g al
can be formulated as Eq. 1.
L = 1
P
P∑
p=1
max{
||∅(G(f+c ,W1),W2)− ∅(G(f+p ,W1),W2)||2−
||∅(G(f+c ,W1),W2)− ∅(G(f−p ,W1),W2)||2, γ}
(1)
where γ is t safe margin and th role of the max operation
with γ is to prevent the ov rall valu of the los function from
being domi ated by easily identifiable triplets [57].
D. Gradient of Parameters
In training stage, the stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
algorithm [66] is used to learn the network parameters. So,
calculating the gradient of parameters is the first important
thing. Let d(fp,W1,W2) be the difference in distance between
{f+c , f+p } and {f+c , f−p } in the triplet sample:
d(fp,W1,W2) =
||∅(G(f+c ,W1),W2)− ∅(G(f+p ,W1),W2)||2−
||∅(G(f+c ,W1),W2)− ∅(G(f−p ,W1),W2)||2
(2)
and the loss function can be rewritten as
L = 1
P
P∑
p=1
max{d(fp,W1,W2), γ} (3)
Then the partial derivative of the loss function about W1 can
be calculated as Eq. 6.
∂L
∂W1
=
1
P
P∑
p=1
h(fp) (4)
h(fp) =
{
∂d(fp,W1,W2)
∂W1
if d(fp,W1,W2) > γ
0 if d(fp,W1,W2) ≤ γ
(5)
Based on the definition of d(fp,W1,W2), its gradient can be
obtained as follows:
∂d(fp,W1,W2)
∂W1
=
2(∅(G(f+c ))− ∅(G(f+p ))) ·
∂∅(G(f+c ))− ∂∅(G(f+p ))
∂W1
−
2(∅(G(f+c ))− ∅(G(f−p ))) ·
∂∅(G(f+c ))− ∂∅(G(f−p ))
∂W1
(6)
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(a) Randomly combining triplet training samples.
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(b) Points-to-center combining mechanism.
Fig. 5. Two Different kinds of mechanisms for combining triplet training samples, where A and B represent two different classes.
where ∅(G(f+c )) is the abbreviation of ∅(G(f+c ,W1),W2),
∅(G(f+p )) is the abbreviation of ∅(G(f+p ,W1),W2), and
∅(G(f−p )) is the abbreviation of ∅(G(f−p ,W1),W2), respec-
tively. For the parameter W2 in feature extractor, its gradient
can also be obtained as W1.
E. Implementation Details
For the parameters in feature extractor, we transfer the
pre-trained deep neural network (i.e. VGG-19) to initialize
them. But for the parameters in color-liked space generator,
they are initialized based on [67] as illustrated in Eq. 7,
which can ensure that all convolutional layers in the network
initially have the approximately same output distribution and
empirically improve the rate of convergence.
W1 =
rand(nl)√
2/nl
(7)
where rand(·) samples from a zero mean, unit standard deriva-
tion gaussian function, and nl is the channel number of inputs
in convolutional layer. In training stage, the momentum and
weight decay of SGD are set to 0.9 and 0.0005, respectively.
The learning rate is set to 10−3 in the beginning and will be
multiplied with damping factor 0.5 when all mini-batches are
traversed and re-allocated randomly.
The inputs of face images are normalized into 224×224×3
with the scale ranging from 0 to 1. In color-liked space
generator, five residual blocks are concatenated to constitute
the generator. For the threshold τ , it is five times the average
Euclidean distance between the real face images and the
anchor image. In testing stage, we extract the deep features of
the learned face images from feature extractor and use an SVM
classifier to predict whether the input face is a presentation
attack. In our paper, we realize the proposed color-liked space
generator and SVM based on the toolbox of MatConvNet with
the version 1.0-beta20 1 and liblinear with the version 1.96 2
[68], respectively.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Experimental Data
Our proposed face PAD algorithm is validated on two
publicly available face PAD databases: Replay-Attack [10] and
OULU-NPU [23]. The detailed descriptions are given below.
1http://www.vlfeat.org/matconvnet/
2https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/∼cjlin/liblinear/
濔瀁濶濻瀂瀅 濔瀁濶濻瀂瀅
Fig. 6. Samples from Replay-Attack database. The first row presents images
taken from the controlled scenario, while the second row corresponds to the
images from the adverse scenario. From the left to the right: real faces and
the corresponding printed photo, displayed image and replayed video attacks.
1) Replay-Attack: The IDIAP Replay-Attack database 3
[10] consists of 1300 video clips of real and attack and
attempts to 50 clients. These clients are divided into 3 subject-
disjoint subsets for training, development and testing (15, 15
and 20, respectively). The real face videos are recorded un-
der two different lighting conditions: controlled and adverse.
Three types of attacks are created: printed photos, displayed
images and replayed videos. In displayed image and replayed
video attacks, high quality images and videos of real clients
are replayed on iPhone 3GS and iPad display devices. For
printed photo attacks, high quality images were printed on A4
papers and presented in front of the camera. Fig. 6 shows some
examples of real and fake faces.
2) OULU-NPU: The OULU-NPU Database 4 [23] consists
of 4950 real access and attack videos and attempts 55 clients.
Similar to Replay-Attack database, all clients are divided into
3 subject-disjoint subsets for training, development and testing
(20, 15 and 20, respectively). These videos were recorded
using the front cameras of six mobile devices in three sessions
with different illumination conditions and background scenes.
Two types of fake faces are created: printed photo and replayed
video attacks. The attacks were created using two printers
and two display devices. For the replayed video attacks, the
original face videos were recorded by 6 different cell phones.
Fig. 7 shows some examples of real and fake faces captured
from the first scenario.
3https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack/download-proc
4https://sites.google.com/site/oulunpudatabase/welcome
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Fig. 5. Two Di ferent kinds of mechanisms for combining triplet training samples, where A and B represent two di ferent cla ses.
here ∅( (f+c )) is the abbreviation of ∅( (f+c , 1), 2),
∅( (f+p )) is the abbreviation of ∅( (f+p , 1), 2), and
∅( (f−p )) is the abbreviation of ∅( (f−p , 1), 2), respec-
tively. For the para eter 2 in feature extractor, its gradient
can also be obtained as 1.
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For the para eters in feature extractor, e transfer the
pre-trained deep neural net ork (i.e. -19) to initialize
the . ut for the para eters in color-liked space generator,
they are initialized based on [67] as i lustrated in Eq. 7,
hich can ensure that a l convolutional layers in the net ork
initia ly have the approxi ately sa e output distribution and
e pirica ly i prove the rate of convergence.
1
rand(nl)
2/nl
(7)
here rand(·) sa ples fro a zero ean, unit standard deriva-
tion gaussian function, and nl is the channel nu ber of inputs
in convolutional layer. In training stage, the o entu and
eight decay of S are set to 0.9 and 0.0005, respectively.
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Fig. 6. Samples from Replay-A tack database. The first row presents images
taken from the contro led scenario, while the second row co responds to the
images from the adverse scenario. From the left to the right: real faces and
the co responding printed photo, displayed image and replayed video a tacks.
1) Replay-A tack: The I I P eplay- tack database 3
[10] consists of 1300 video clips of real and a tack and
a te pts to 50 clients. These clients are divided into 3 subject-
disjoint subsets for training, develop ent and testing (15, 15
and 20, respectively). The real face videos are recorded un-
der t o di ferent lighting conditions: contro led and adverse.
Three types of a tacks are created: printed photos, displayed
i ages and replayed videos. In displayed i age and replayed
video a tacks, high quality i ages and videos of real clients
are replayed on iPhone 3 S and iPad display devices. For
printed photo a tacks, high quality i ages ere printed on 4
papers and presented in front of the ca era. Fig. 6 sho s so e
exa ples of real and fake faces.
2) L - P : The L - P atabase 4 [23] consists
of 4950 real access and a tack videos and a te pts 55 clients.
Si ilar to eplay- tack database, a l clients are divided into
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(20, 15 and 20, respectively). These videos ere recorded
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and t o display devices. For the replayed video a tacks, the
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Fig. 7 sho s so e exa ples of real and fake faces captured
fro the first scenario.
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in convolutional layer. In training stage, the o entu and
weight decay of SGD are set to 0.9 and 0.0005, respectively.
The learning rate is set to 10−3 in the beginning and will be
ultiplied with da ping factor 0.5 when all ini-batches are
traversed and re-allocated randomly.
The inputs of face images are normalized into 224×224×3
with the scale ranging from 0 to 1. In color-liked space
generator, five residual blocks are concatenated to constitute
the generator. For the threshold τ , it is five times the average
Euclidean distance between the real face images and the
anchor image. In testing stage, we extract the deep features of
the learned face images from feature extractor and use an SVM
classifier to predict whether the input face is a presentation
attack. In our paper, we realize the proposed color-liked space
generator and SVM based on the toolbox of MatConvNet with
the version 1.0-beta20 1 and liblinear with the version 1.96 2
[68], respectively.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Experimental Data
Our proposed face PAD algorithm is validated on two
publicly available face PAD databases: Replay-Attack [10] and
OULU-NPU [23]. The detailed descriptions are given below.
1http://www.vlfeat.org/matconvnet/
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E. Implementation Details
For the parameters in feature extractor, we transfer the
pre-trained deep neural network (i.e. VGG-19) to initialize
them. But for the parameters in color-liked space generator,
they are initialized based on [67] as illustrated in Eq. 7,
which can ensure that all convolutional layers in the network
initially have the approximately same output distribution and
empirically improv the rate of c nverg nce.
W1 =
rand(nl)√
2/nl
(7)
where rand(·) samples from a zero mean, unit standa d deriva-
tion gaussian function, and nl is the channel number of inputs
in convolutional layer. In training stage, the momentum and
weight decay of SGD are set to 0.9 and 0.0005, respectively.
The learning rate is set to 10−3 in the beginning and will be
multiplied with damping factor 0.5 when all mini-batches are
traversed and re-allocated randomly.
The inputs of face images are normalize into 224×224×3
with t sc le ranging from 0 to 1. In color-liked space
generator, fiv residu l blocks are concat ated to constitute
the generator. For the threshold τ , it is five times the average
Euclidean distance between the real f ce images and the
anchor imag . In t sting stage, we extract the deep features of
the lear d face imag s from feature extractor and use an SVM
classifi r to predict whether the input face is a present tion
attack. In our paper, we realize the proposed color-liked space
generator and SVM based on the toolbox of MatConvNet with
the version 1.0-beta20 1 and liblinear with the version 1.96 2
[68], respectively.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Experim ntal Data
Our proposed face PAD algorithm is validated on two
publicly available face PAD databases: Replay-Attack [10] and
OULU-NPU [23]. The detailed descriptions are given below.
1) Replay-Attack: The IDIAP Replay-Attack database 3
[10] consists of 1300 video clips of real and attack and
attempts to 50 clients. These clients are divided into 3 subject-
disjoint subsets for training, development and testing (15, 15
1http://www.vlfeat.org/matconvnet/
2https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/∼cjlin/liblinear/
3https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack/download-proc
Fig. 6. Samples fro eplay- ttack database. The first row presents images
taken from the controlled scenario, while the second row corresponds to the
images from the adverse scenario. From the left to the right: real faces and
the corresponding printed photo, displayed image and replayed video attacks.
and 20, respectively). The real face videos are recorded un-
der two different lighting conditions: controlled and adverse.
Three types of attacks are created: printed photos, displayed
images and replayed videos. In displayed image and replayed
video attacks, high quality images and videos of real clients
are replayed on iPhone 3GS and iPad display devices. For
printed photo attacks, high quality images were printed on A4
papers and presented in front of the camera. Fig. 6 shows some
ex mples of real and fake faces.
2) OULU-NPU: The OULU-NPU Database 4 [23] consists
of 4950 real acc ss and attack videos and attempts 55 clients.
Similar to Repl y-Attac database, all clients are divided into
3 subject-disjoint subsets for training, development and testing
(20, 15 and 20, respectively). These videos were recorded
using the front cameras of six mobile devices in three sessions
with different illumination conditions and background scenes.
Two types of fake faces are created: printed photo and replayed
video attacks. The attacks were created using two printers
and two display devices. For the replayed video attacks, the
original face videos were recorded by 6 different cell phones.
Fig. 7 shows some examples of real and fake faces captured
from the first scenario.
B. Evaluation Protocol
For erformance ev luation, he resu ts are reported in term
of recently standardized ISO/IEC 30107-3 etrics [69]: Attack
Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) and Bona Fide
4https://sites.google.com/site/oulunpudatabase/welcome
Fig. 6. Sa ples fro eplay- tt se. The first ro presents i ages
taken fro the controlled scenari , t second ro corresponds to the
i ages fro the adverse scenari . r t left to the right: real faces and
the corresponding printed photo, displayed i age and replayed video attacks.
1) Replay-Attack: The I I P eplay- ttack database 3
[10] consists of 1300 video clips of real and attack and
atte pts to 50 clients. These clients are divided into 3 subject-
disjoint subsets for training, develop ent and testing (15, 15
and 20, respectively). The real face videos are recorded un-
der two different lighting conditions: controlled and adverse.
Three types of attacks are created: printed photos, displayed
i ages and replayed videos. In displayed i age and replayed
video attacks, high quality images and videos of real clients
are replayed on iPhone 3GS and iPad display devices. For
printed photo attacks, high quality images were printed on A4
papers and presented in front of the camera. Fig. 6 shows some
examples of real and fake faces.
2) OULU-NPU: The OULU-NPU Database 4 [23] consists
of 49 0 real access and attack video and attempts 55 clients.
Similar to Repl y-Attack database, all clients are divided into
3 subject-disjoint subsets for train ng, development and testi g
(20, 15 and 20, respectively). These videos were recorded
using the front cameras of six mobile devices in three sessions
with different illumination conditions and background scenes.
Two types of fake faces are created: printed photo and replayed
video attacks. The attacks were created using two printers
and two display devices. For the replayed video attacks, the
original face videos were recorded by 6 different cell phones.
Fig. 7 shows some examples of real and fake faces captured
from the first scenari .
3https://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack/download-proc
4https://sites.google.com/site/oulunpudatabase/welcome
7TABLE II
THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT γ ON APER(%), BPCER(%) AND ACER((%) OF REPLAY-ATTACK AND OULU-NPU DATABASES.
Replay-Attack Database
γ
Overall attacks Printed photo Displayed image Replayed video
APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
0.1 1.4 0.0 0.7 2.1 0.2 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
0.5 2.4 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.5
1 1.7 0.0 0.8 0.0 2.0 1.0 3.6 0.0 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.1
5 4.5 0.0 2.3 0.2 0.0 0.1 1.4 0.0 0.7 2.3 0.0 1.2
OULU-NPU Database
γ
Overall attacks Printed photo Displayed image Replayed video
APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
0.1 8.7 10.5 9.6 4.2 6.2 5.2 - - - 6.2 7.0 6.6
0.5 3.3 9.4 6.3 4.9 3.7 4.3 - - - 7.0 4.2 5.6
1 6.0 7.0 6.5 3.1 6.6 4.9 - - - 5.7 4.5 5.1
5 9.7 9.9 9.8 1.3 12.6 7.0 - - - 5.7 5.6 5.7
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Overall attacks Printed photo Displayed image Replayed video
APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
0.1 8.7 10.5 9.6 4.2 6.2 5.2 - - - 6.2 7.0 6.6
0.5 3.3 9.4 6.3 4.9 3.7 4.3 - - - 7.0 4.2 5.6
1 6.0 7.0 6.5 3.1 6.6 4.9 - - - 5.7 4.5 5.1
5 9.7 . . 1.3 12.6 7.0 - - - 5.7 5.6 5.7
Fig. 7. Samples from OULU-NPU database. From left to right: real faces and
the corresponding printed photo, printed photo, replayed video and replayed
video attacks.
Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER). In principle,
these two metrics correspond to the FAR and FRR commonly
used in the PAD related literature. However, different with the
(false acceptance rate) FAR and false rejection rate (FRR), the
attacker’s potential (such as expertise, resources and motiva-
tion) in the worst case scenario are taken into considered by
APCER and BPCER. It is noted that the APCER and BPCER
depend on the decision threshold. Therefore, the development
set is used to fine tuning the system parameters and estimate
the threshold value. To compare the overall system perfor-
mance in a single value, the Average Classification Error Rate
(ACER) is computed which is the average of the APCER and
the BPCER at the decision threshold estimated by Equal Error
Rate (EER) on the development set.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present and discuss the detection results
obtained in the generated color-liked space. Firstly, the impact
of hyper-parameters γ is explored. Then, we compare our
proposed points to center triplet training sample combination
mechanism with conventional randomly combination mech-
anism. After that, we visualize the distribution of real and
fake faces in the proposed color-liked space and compare the
detection results with that computed in existing color spaces.
Finally, the performance of our method is compared against the
state-of-the-art algorithms and the generalization capabilities
of learned color-liked space are evaluated by conducting cross-
database experiments.
A. Safe Margin for Feature Extractor
In this part, the influence of the hyper-parameter γ on
detection performance is presented and its optimal value is also
been determined. Table II illustrates the detection results of
different γ. It can be clearly seen that γ has a great influence on
the performance. For example, when it is set to 0.1, the ACER
of replayed video attack of Replay-Attack database is 0.0%.
However, when it is set to 5, the ACER changes to 1.2%. For
how to set the value of γ, we find that the optimal values for
different databases are different. More specifically, for Replay-
Attack database, γ should be set to 0.1 with the averaged
ACER=0.5%; but for OULU-NPU database, γ should be
set to 1 with the averaged ACER=5.4%. While considering
the averaged ACER of both Replay-Attack and OULU-NPU
databases, we set the γ to 0.5 in our proposed method. In
addition, the detection performance does not improve as the
increase of safe margin between the real faces and fake faces.
We conjecture the reason may lie in that larger γ will cause the
network to over-fit during training. Especially for face PAD,
the training data is very limited.
B. Points-to-Center Combination Mechanism
As aforementioned, the triplet training samples are com-
bined based on the proposed points-to-center (P2C) mecha-
nism instead of randomly combination (RC). Table III shows
the detection results obtained based on these two different
combination mechanisms. From the table we can find that
our proposed P2C mechanism significantly improves overall
system performance, except for the ACER of replayed video
attack of Replayed-Attack database. Comparing the detection
Fig. 7. Samples from OULU- t . ro left to right: real faces and
the corresponding printed photo, printed photo, replayed video and replayed
video attacks.
B. Evaluation Protocol
For performance evaluation, the results are reported in term
of recently standardized ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics [69]: Attack
Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) and Bona Fide
Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER). In principle,
these two metrics correspond to the FAR and FRR commonly
used in the PAD related literature. However, different with the
(false acceptance rate) FAR and false rejection rate (FRR), th
attacker’s pote tial (such as expertise, resources and motiva-
tion) in the worst case s enario are taken into considered by
APCER and BPCER. It is noted that the APCER a d BPCER
depend on the decision threshold. Therefore, the development
set is used to fine tuning the system parameters and estimate
the threshold value. To compare the overall system perfor-
mance in a single value, the Average Classification Error Rate
(ACER) is computed which is the average of the APCER and
the BPCER at the decision threshold estimated by Equal Error
Rate (EER) on the development set.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
I this sec ion, we present and discuss the detection results
obt ined in the generated color-liked space. Firstly, the impact
of hyper-parameters γ is expl red. Then, we compare our
proposed points to center triplet training sample combination
mechanism with conventional randomly combination mech-
anism. After that, we visualize the distribution of real and
fake faces in the proposed color-liked space and compare the
detection results with that computed in existing color spaces.
Finally, the performance of our method is compared against the
state-of-the-art algorithms and the generalization capabilities
of learned color-liked space are evaluated by conducting cross-
database experiments.
A. Safe Margin for F ature Extractor
In this part, the influence of the hyper-parameter γ on
detection performance is presented and its optimal value is also
been d termined. Table II illustrat s the detection results of
different γ. I can be cl arly seen that γ has a great influence on
the performance. For example, when it is set to 0.1, the ACER
of replayed video attack of Replay-Attack database is 0.0%.
However, when it is set to 5, the ACER changes to 1.2%. For
how to set the value of γ, we find that the optimal values for
different databases are different. More specifically, for Replay-
Attack database, γ should be set to 0.1 with the averaged
ACER=0.5%; but for OULU-NPU database, γ should be
set to 1 with the averaged ACER=5.4%. While considering
the averaged ACER of both Replay-Attack and OULU-NPU
databases, we set the γ to 0.5 in our proposed method. In
addition, the detection performance does not improve as the
increase of safe margin between the real faces and fake faces.
We conjecture the reason may lie in that larger γ will cause the
network to over-fit during trai ing. Esp ially for face PAD,
the training data is very limited.
B. Points-to-Center Combination Mechanism
As aforementioned, the triplet training samples are com-
bined based on the proposed points-to-center (P2C) mecha-
nism instead of randomly combination (RC). Table III shows
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THE COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR POINTS TO CENTER (P2C) SAMPLE COMBINATION MECHANISM AND RANDOMLY COMBINATION (RC) MECHANISM.
Replay-Attack Database
Mechanism Overall attacks Printed photo Displayed image Replayed videoAPCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
RC 4.0 0.0 2.1 2.7 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.2
P2C 2.4 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.5
OULU-NPU Database
Mechanism Overall attacks Printed photo Displayed image Replayed videoAPCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
RC 10.5 17.1 13.8 7.3 7.3 7.3 - - - 4.7 7.8 6.2
P2C 3.3 9.4 6.3 4.9 3.7 4.3 - - - 7.0 4.2 5.6
the detection results obtained based on these two different
combination mechanisms. From the table we can find that
our proposed P2C mechanism significantly improves overall
system performance, except for the ACER of replayed video
attack of Replayed-Attack database. Comparing the detection
results of the two databases, one conclusion can be obtained
that the performance improvement of P2C mechanism is more
obvious for the OULU-NPU database. More specifically, the
ACER of overall OULU-NPU database has dropped more
than 54%. But for the overall Replayed-Attack database, the
ACER has dropped by 43%. The reason may lie in that the
distribution of real and fake faces in Replay-Attack database
is simpler than that of OULU-NPU database, which limits the
superiority of P2C.
C. Visualize the Data Distribution and Color-liked Space
For a clearer analysis of the generated color-liked space,
the sample distributions of Replay-Attack and OULU-NPU
databases are described in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, respectively.
From the figures 10(a) and 11(a), we can clearly see that the
real and fake face images are overlapped in RGB color space.
However, in our generated space, the real and fake faces can
be well separated, and there is a safe margin between them. By
comparing Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, we can find that the Replay-
Attack database is easier to be addressed than the OULU-NPU
database, which is consistent with the results shown in Table
II.
Apart from plotting the distribution, the generated color-
liked space is also been visualized in Fig. 8. Since the output
of the generator has three channels, we visualize the randomly
selected real and the fake faces in the learned color-liked
space according to different channel combination sequences.
From the visualization results, the difference between the real
and fake faces is mainly revealed in color saturation. More
specifically, the real faces are more saturated than the fake
faces, which can be explained by the display colour gamut
differences shown in Fig. 9. Compared Fig. 8 with Fig. 9, we
can summarize that the generated color-liked space learning
process essentially magnifies the differences between the color
saturation of real and fake faces.
D. Comparison with Existing Color Spaces
Furthermore, we extract the last full connected layer of
VGG-19 from the learned color-liked space and existing
color spaces (i.e. RGB, HSV and YCbCr), and compare the
detection results in Table IV. Based on the comparison, we
can observe that our proposed color-liked space has greatly
improved the detection performance. For instance, in RGB
color space, the averaged APCER, BPCER and ACER of
Replay-Attack and OULU-NPU are 6.1%, 3.1%, 4.6% and
17.7%, 11.6% 14.7%, respectively. However, the averaged
protocols obtained in our color-liked space are 1.1%, 0.1%,
0.6% and 5.1%, 5.8%, 5.4%. This indicates that the color-
liked space makes it easier to distinguish the real and fake
faces compared to RGB, HSV or YCbCr spaces.
E. Comparison with the State of the Art
In order to be consistent with the original evaluation pro-
tocol and to facilitate the later works compared with ours,
we show the original EER, HTER [10] and the latest APCER,
BPCER, ACER. Table V gives a comparison with the state-of-
the-art face PAD approaches proposed in the literature. Apart
from extracting VGG features, we also extract LBP features
from the learned color-liked space. It can be seen that our
proposed color-liked space based method outperforms the-
state-of-the-art algorithms on Replay-Attack database. Espe-
cially compared with [39], the HTER of VGG features is
significantly reduced to 0.7%, even though the EER is not
as good as [39]. For hand-crafted feature, the LBP extracted
from our learned color-liked space takes on better superiority
compared with [29] that extracts LBP features from existing
color spaces. Regarding the OULU-NPU database, we com-
pare the proposed method with its baseline and [52]. From
the results, our learned color-liked space based method also
significantly surpasses them. As for the learned color-liked
space, we find that the extracted VGG features can get better
detection results than LBP features. This can be interpreted
as the generated color-liked space is learned based on VGG
features rather than LBP.
F. Cross-Database Analysis
In real-world applications, face PAD techniques are oper-
ated in open environments, where the conditions and attack
scenario are unknown. The conduct cross-database evaluation
is conducted to gain insight into the generalization capabilities
of our learned color-liked space. More specifically, the color-
liked space generator is trained and tuned on one of the
9TABLE IV
COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR GENERATED COLOR-LIKED SPACE AND EXISTING COLOR SPACES.
Replay-Attack Database
Space Overall attacks Printed photo Displayed image Replayed videoAPCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
RGB 8.4 2.7 5.6 4.2 6.9 5.5 7.5 2.9 5.2 4.2 0.0 2.1
HSV 14.9 9.0 11.9 2.5 5.2 3.8 15.0 9.5 12.2 11.7 4.5 8.1
YCbCr 11.3 10.5 10.9 2.8 3.4 3.1 11.0 5.5 8.2 5.5 4.9 5.2
Our Method 2.4 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.5
OULU-NPU Database
Space Overall attacks Printed photo Displayed image Replayed videoAPCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
RGB 18.7 11.9 15.3 14.6 9.9 12.3 - - - 19.9 13.1 16.5
HSV 14.9 19.0 17.0 7.3 10.6 8.9 - - - 14.6 16.8 15.7
YCbCr 17.8 9.3 13.6 13.0 11.9 12.5 - - - 10.3 6.7 8.5
Our Method 3.3 9.4 6.3 4.9 3.7 4.3 - - - 7.0 4.2 5.6
TABLE V
COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURE AND STATE-OF-THE-ART METHODS ON THE TWO BENCHMARK DATABASES USING THE
BASED EVALUATION.
Methods Replay-Attack OULU-NPUEER HTER APCER BPCER ACER EER HTER APCER BPCER ACER
LBP-TOP [42] 7.9 7.6 - - - - - - - -
LDP-TOP [43] 2.5 1.7 - - - - - - - -
DMD [46] 5.3 3.7 - - - - - - - -
Scale LBP [30] 0.7 3.1 - - - - - - - -
Deep CNN [35] 6.1 2.1 - - - - - - - -
3D CNN [39] 0.3 1.2 - - - - - - - -
Image Quality [52]† - 15.2 17.9+ 12.5 15.2+ 31.9 36.3 56.4 24.5 40.5
RGB LBP [29]‡ 7.3 11.2 10.1 14.3 12.2 11.2 18.5 18.8 20.0 19.4
HSV LBP [29]‡ 7.7 9.8 18.5 6.1 13.7 12.0 15.5 21.1 15.9 18.5
YCbCr LBP [29]‡ 4.1 7.4 14.6 8.9 10.4 14.2 17.8 21.7 13.0 17.3
Color-liked Space LBP 2.8 2.9 5.0 4.6 4.8 8.6 12.2 14.9 10.5 12.7
Color-liked Space VGG 0.8 0.7 2.4 0.0 1.2 7.6 6.0 3.3 9.4 6.3
+ means the actual value is greater than the value.
† was retested on OULU-NPU database.
‡ was retested on Replay-Attack and OULU-NPU databases.
TABLE VI
THE PERFORMANCE OF CROSS-DATABASE EXPERIMENT ON THE REPLAY-ATTACK AND OULU-NPU DATABASES COMPARED WITH BASELINE METHOD.
Methods Train on: Replay-Attack Evaluate on: OULU-NPU Train on: OULU-NPU Evaluate on: Replay-AttackTrain set Dev set Test set Train set Dev set Test set
Image Quality [52] 50.4 50.1 48.8 52.4 36.8 39.1
RGB LBP[29] 53.0 53.4 52.7 56.9 56.0 56.1
HSV LBP[29] 51.1 52.8 51.6 51.7 52.9 50.0
YCbCr LBP[29] 48.4 52.1 52.7 47.4 43.5 44.8
Color-liked Space LBP 49.9 47.1 44.2 46.7 48.8 48.3
Color-liked Space VGG 44.7 44.4 46.2 41.6 42.6 36.2
databases and then tested on another database. The computed
ACERs are summarized in Table VI.
When the generator is trained on OULU-NPU and tested
on Replay-Attack, we notice that the averaged ACER of VGG
features is 40.1%. When the generator is trained on Replay-
Attack and tested on OULU-NPU, the averaged metric is
45.1%. From these results, we conclude that the generator
trained on Replay-Attack is not able to be generalized as good
as trained on OULU-NPU. It is caused that the OULU-NPU
database contains more variations in the collecting environ-
ment (e.g., light and camera quality) compared to Replay-
Attack. Finally, compared with the baseline of color LBP
based method [29], our proposed method is more stable.
Although our proposed method can work well in intra
database and cross database tests, it is still difficult to deal
with face PAD when the light of collecting environment is
variant. This is due to the fact that the brightness of captured
face images can affect the distribution of colour gamut. In
addition to light variation, the quality of the camera is also an
important factor in the effectiveness of our detection method.
Especially for the camera is not good enough to capture color
information, our proposed countermeasure will may not be
applicable.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we addressed the problem of face PAD from
the viewpoint of the color space analysis. Based on triplet
training and perceptual similarity measure mechanisms, a new
10
(a) Replay-Attack database in the generated color-liked space.
(b) OULU-NPU database in the generated color-liked space.
Fig. 8. Visualize some randomly selected real and fake face images of Replay-Attack and OULU-NPU databases in the generated color-liked space. From
left to right, different colors are obtained by different color-liked channels combination.
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TABLE III
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR POINTS TO CENTER (P2C) SAMPLE COMBINATION MECHANISM AND RANDOMLY COMBINATION (RC) MECHANISM.
Replay-Attack Database
Mechanism Overall attacks Printed photo Displayed image Replayed videoAPCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
RC 4.0 0.0 2.1 2.7 0.0 1.4 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.2
P2C 2.4 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.5
OULU-NPU Database
Mechanism Overall attacks Printed photo Displayed image Replayed videoAPCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER APCER BPCER ACER
RC 10.5 17.1 13.8 7.3 7.3 7.3 - - - 4.7 7.8 6.2
P2C 3.3 9.4 6.3 4.9 3.7 4.3 - - - 7.0 4.2 5.6
the detection results obtained based on these two different
combination mechanisms. From the table we can find that
our proposed P2C mechanism significantly improves overall
system performance, except for the ACER of replayed video
attack of Replayed-Attack database. Comparing the detection
results of the two databases, one conclusion can be obtained
that the performance improvement of P2C mechanism is more
obvious for the OULU-NPU database. More specifically, the
ACER of overall OULU-NPU database has dropped more
than 54%. But for the overall Replayed-Attack database, the
ACER has dropped by 43%. The reason may lie in hat the
distribution of real and fake faces in Replay-Attack database
is simpler than that of OULU-NPU database, which limits the
superiority of P2C.
Fig. 9. Colour gamut of a monitor (RGB) and a printer (CMYK) compared
with the whole pallet of visible colours [29].
C. Visualize the Data Distribution and Color-liked Space
For a clearer analysis of the generated color-liked space,
the sample distributions of Replay-Attack and OULU-NPU
databases are described in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, respectively.
From the figures 10(a) and 11(a), we can clearly see that the
real and fake face images are overlapped in RGB color space.
However, in our generated space, the real and fake faces can
be well separated, and there is a safe margin between them. By
comparing Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, we can find that the Replay-
Attack database is easier to be addressed than the OULU-NPU
database, which is consistent with the results shown in Table
II.
Apart from plotting the distribution, the generated color-
liked space is also been visualized in Fig. 8. Since the output
of the generator has three channels, we visualize the randomly
selected real and the fake faces in the learned color-liked
space according to different channel combination sequences.
From the visualization results, the difference between the real
and fake faces is mainly revealed in color saturation. More
specifically, the real faces are more saturated than the fake
faces, which can be explained by the display colour gamut
differences shown in Fig. 9. Compared Fig. 8 with Fig. 9, we
can summarize that the generated color-liked space learning
process essentially magnifies the differences between the color
satu ation f real and fake faces.
D. Comparison with Existing Color Spaces
Furthermore, we extract the last full connected layer of
VGG-19 from the learned color-liked space and existing
color spaces (i.e. RGB, HSV and YCbCr), and compare the
detection results in Table IV. Based on the comparison, we
can observe that our proposed color-liked space has greatly
improved the detection performance. For instance, in RGB
color space, the averaged APCER, BPCER and ACER of
Replay-Attack and OULU-NPU are 6.1%, 3.1%, 4.6% and
17.7%, 11.6% 14.7%, respectively. However, the averaged
protocols obtained in our color-liked space are 1.1%, 0.1%,
0.6% and 5.1%, 5.8%, 5.4%. This indicates that the color-
liked space makes it easier to distinguish the real and fake
faces compared to RGB, HSV or YCbCr spaces.
E. Comparison with the State of the Art
In order to be consistent with the original evaluation pro-
tocol and to facilitate the later works compared with ours,
we show the original EER, HTER [10] and the latest APCER,
BPCER, ACER. Table V gives a comparison with the state-of-
the-art face PAD approaches proposed in the literature. Apart
from extracting VGG features, we also extract LBP features
from the learned color-liked space. It can be seen that our
proposed color-liked space based method outperforms the-
state-of-the-art algorithms on Replay-Attack database. Espe-
cially compared with [39], the HTER of VGG features is
significantly reduced to 0.7%, even though the EER is not
as good as [39]. For hand-crafted feature, the LBP extracted
from our learned color-liked space takes on better superiority
compared with [29] that extracts LBP features from existing
color spaces. Regarding the OULU-NPU database, we com-
pare the proposed method with its baseline and [52]. From
i . . ri t r ( ) co pared
it t
color-liked space was generated for fake face detection. Instead
of randomly combining triplet training samples, we proposed
a points-to-center combination method to solve the problem of
instability in training costs. Extensive experiments on two lat-
est and challenging presentation attack databases (the Replay-
Attack and OULU-NPU) showed excellent results. On OULU-
NPU database, the proposed color-liked space based method
outperformed the baseline, while very competitive results
were achieved on Replay-Attack database. Furthermore, in
our cross-database evaluation, our proposed method showed
promising generalization capabilities. Overall, from the results
of Replay-Attack and OULU-NPU databases, we find that
external-environment factors (e.g. light and camera quality)
limit the effectiveness of our proposed detection method.
Thus, we will focus on how to eliminate the influence of
external environmental factors and improve the robustness of
our method. Finally, the proposed method just chosen one
anchor image from the real face images, which means the
proposed method only minimized the intraclass distance in
real face set. Therefore, we will also try to choose the second
anchor image from the fake face images and minimize the
intraclass distance in real and fake face sets.
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Fig. 2. The distribution of some real and fake faces of Replay-Attack database
[10] in RGB color space. The red circles are the real faces. The green, blue
and black circles are fake faces. In this figure, we extract features from the
pre-trained VGG-19 model [24] and visualize them in a 3D space.
and [9], [13] detected presented fake faces in RGB color
space. Although these methods can achieve good detection
performance, the real faces and fake faces are overlapped
in original color spaces as shown in Fig. 2. Especially with
the popularity of high-resolution screen and high-definition
printer, the fake faces are getting closer to the real faces
leading to detection task becomes more difficult. Therefore,
we propose an end-to-end deep learning network to generate
a new color-liked space, where the real and fake faces can be
separated as much as possible.
Inspired by generative adversarial network (GAN) [21], a
color-liked space generator is constructed to map existing color
spaces. Then, a feature extractor is designed to obtain features
from the learned color-liked space. As aforementioned, the
goal of our proposed network is to separate the real and
fakes as much as possible. Therefore, we introduce a novel
points-to-center triplet mechanism to train the generator. The
flowchart is illustrated in Fig. 3. Finally, the extracted features
are fed into a Support Vector Machine (SVM) [22] classifier to
detect face presentation attack. We train and test our proposed
method on two public available databases: Replay-Attack [10]
and OULU-NPU [23]. The experimental results demonstrate
the effectiveness and excellent generalization capabilities of
the proposed method in various fake face detection compared
to the state-of-the-art approaches.
Among the significant contributions of this present paper,
we can cite:
1) Different from most previous works that detect pre-
sentation attack in existing color spaces, we propose
a novel and appealing approach based on color-liked
space analysis. By maximizing interclass distance and
minimizing intraclass distance, the learned color-liked
space can separate fake faces and genuine ones as much
as possible instead of overlapping each other.
2) We develop a new points-to-center triplet training mecha-
nism. Unlike traditional mechanism, the proposed points-
to-set mechanism can guarantee a stable decline in triplet
loss.
3) Extensive experimental analysis is conducted on the two
latest and challenging face PAD databases using their
pre-defined publicly well-defined experimental evaluation
protocols ensuring the reproducibility of the results and
a fair comparison with the state-of-the-art methods. Fur-
thermore, in our cross-database evaluation, our generated
color-liked space shows promising generalization capa-
bilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II reviews the existing state-of-the-art methods of face
PAD and briefly provides the development of triplet network.
Section III describes our proposed color-liked space analysis
based method. Section IV provides the details of experimental
setup and Section V discusses the obtained results. Finally, in
Section VI, we conclude the paper and discuss some directions
for future research.
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